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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates if opacity (as measured by derivatives usage) creates 
value for investors and the managers of hedge funds that charge performance 
fees. Since we do not identify a positive relation between opacity and 
managers’ revenue, it is not possible to state that opacity is a source of 
manager’s value creation for hedge fund investors and managers. However, 
considering that opacity is positively associated with risk-taking and negatively 
related with  investors’ adjusted returns, we suggest policies aiming at 
protecting investors, especially those less qualified. We examine a unique 
and comprehensive database related to the positions in derivatives taken by 
managers, which was enabled  due to specific disclosure regulatory demands 
of the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission, where detailed information 
on hedge funds’ portfolio allocation should be provided on a monthly basis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Sato (2014, p. 2) claims that funds’ opacity level is derived from the portfolio’s non-disclosure 
and/or from the non-comprehension of the complex assets’ pricing operated by funds. Brunnermeier, 
Oehmke and Jel (2009) define these complex assets as those that present cash flow structures 
that cannot be easily understood and projected by investors.
Thus, hedge funds can be considered the most opaque segment in the fund industry due to 
their operational complexity (this segment allows a variety of investments’ strategies, especially 
leveraged operations). Thus, as a basic premise, we assume that hedge fund managers who invest 
more in derivatives increase their fund’s opacity level. According to Arora et al. (2009), derivatives 
have many opacity sources such as the composition of the payout return equation and the large 
volume of negotiations associated with a low level of transparency in their markets.
Therefore, this paper aims to verify if opacity (as measured by derivatives usage) creates 
value for investors and managers of hedge funds that charge performance fees. To test our main 
hypothesis, we investigate if managers increase the funds’ opacity to maximize their incomes to 
the detriment of the investors’ interest, as indicated by Sato (2014). This can be confirmed by 
means of the empirical relation between derivatives and: (i) the funds’ risk level, (ii) the investors’ 
yields and (iii) the managers’ remuneration (calculated on the fund’s net worth).
In summary, we show that the high level of opaque assets (derivatives) raises the funds’ risk 
but does not necessarily contribute to a higher adjusted return paid to investors either monthly 
or annually. Additionally, in regard to the intrinsic benefits received by managers, we doid  not 
find a significant and positive relation between investments in derivatives and the fund’s net 
flows in funds that charge performance fees. Our empirical findings indicate that the increase 
in opacity ( as measured by  percentage of the net worth invested in derivatives) does not create 
value for the investor (qualified or not). The coefficients of models exploring the manager’s value 
generation dimension were not significant.
We innovate by exploring a unique derivative database composed of positions of swaps, 
options, futures, and forward markets. Although Koski and Pontiff (1999) considered the impact 
of investments made in options, futures, and securities interest rates on fund profitability and 
volatility, their data was  supported by telephone interviews. Later, Chen (2011) used only 
dummies differentiating users and non-users and types of derivatives as a proxy for derivatives 
usage. Therefore, while the literature in this field has focused on the US market and does not 
apply detailed quantitative information on derivative investments (e.g., the volume traded), our 
analyses are based on such data, which are available for the Brazilian market but not for many 
other markets.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Opacity, Derivatives anD risk-taking strategy
An investment fund is considered opaque if the information about its returns’ volatility is 
incomprehensible or inaccessible for the majority of current or  potential investors because of its 
non-disclosure and/or because of the use of complex assets to build the fund’s portfolio (Sato, 
2014). Arora et al. (2009) define derivatives as complex assets due to their payout composition, 
and the need for complex pricing models in order to evaluate their payoffs, as well as  their low 
transparency level. 
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According to Chen (2011), managers can employ derivatives for both speculative and hedging 
purposes, depending if the derivatives usage is positively or negatively associated with risk. 
Cumming, Dai and Johan (2013) define the strategy of risk taking in investment funds as a 
potential source value creation for managers, since they  usually change the investment funds’ 
risk, aiming to affect theresults disclosed at the end of every year, and to attract higher inflows. 
Given that the managers of hedge funds are typically compensated by two types of fees (the 
fixed one, which is based on the funds’ net worth value and the variable one, generally related 
to the funds’ performance), this remuneration structure can be compared to a call portfolio. 
The owner of this call (represented by the manager) will choose a higher variance related to the 
asset’s price, considering that the higher the variance, the greater the probability of the asset’s 
value to exceed the strike price. 
Moreover, Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2007) highlighted that, as the fund is prone to receive 
more resources if its relative performance (compared with its benchmark) is satisfactory, its manager 
will have implicit incentives to distort his choices of portfolio’s asset allocation, aiming to amplify 
the higher inflows’ probability. The positive relation between flows and relative performance 
triggers this phenomenon because managers’ remuneration is connected to the amount managed. 
Managers running investment funds with low performance are more likely to increase the 
tracking error variance as measured by the difference between fund’s return related to its benchmark 
than to raise the fund’s standard deviation. Accordingly, the agent´s risk taking behavior is 
characterized by his or her tolerance level and the fund’s return position related to its reference 
index. This strategy may generate a portfolio with a return/risk relationship that is considerably 
distinct from the one preferred by investors, notably in the context of funds that present a low 
disclosure level (Basak, Pavalova, & Shapiro, 2008).
American studies have empirically found a negative relation between derivatives and risk-
taking strategies. Koski and Pontiff (1999) analyzed 675 US stock funds from 1992 to 1994, and 
observed that 21% of their sample used derivatives for hedging purposes, and derivatives users 
and non-users did not present significant differences in comparison with their funds’ adjusted 
returns. In addition, Chen (2011) demonstrated that (considering data for 2006 only), 71% 
of the hedge funds employed derivatives to reduce risk (total, systematic and non-systematic). 
According to Aragon and Martin (2012) stock options were employed by hedge funds to reduce 
risk and increase Sharpe’s ratios. Recently, Cici and Palacios (2015) also evaluated the positions 
of options maintained by managers of US stock funds from 2003 to 2010, verifying that options 
reduced the funds’ risk but were not correlated with funds’ performance.
2.2. the investOr’s level Of qualificatiOn anD the funD’s perfOrmance
As this article analyzes whether the use of derivatives creates value for hedge fund investors and 
managers who charge a performance fees, considering the segment of qualified and non-qualified 
investors, it is important to highlight additional studies that explored this subject. Paz, Iquiapaza 
and Bressan (2017), for example, analyzed  investor influence on monitoring the performance of 
equity investment funds from January 2005 to April 2015. They found that the net annual return 
on institutional funds was 0.15% higher than the return on retail funds. Using gross returns, 
they found that retail funds generated, on average, a yearly return of 10%, while institutional 
funds obtained only 8.93% per annum. This difference between net and gross return measures is 
possibly due to the existence of a management fee structure that is less favorable to non-qualified 
investors. Regarding the risk-adjusted performance measure, the authors confirmed that funds 
directed to institutional investors achieve the highest levels.
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On the other hand, James and Karceski (2006) compared the return on American mutual 
funds, both retail and institutional, noting that, although institutional funds have significantly 
lower management fees, they did not necessarily show, on average, higher returns than retail funds.
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) compared the relationship between the flows and the performance 
of retail funds and fiduciary pension funds. It was observed that, in contrast to mutual fund 
investors, pension fund investors tend to punish underperforming fund managers by redeeming 
their shares. However, these resources are not necessarily reallocated in the winning funds. This 
behavior can be explained by the fact that investors in  pension funds (as compared to investors 
of retail funds) employ, more frequently, risk-adjusted return measures during the assessment 
of managers.
Additionally, using a sample of American mutual funds, Gil-Bazo and Verdú (2009) observed 
that the funds with the worst performance charged higher rates. This phenomenon was more 
pronounced in the sample of funds destined for less qualified investors. Salganik (2015) compared 
two samples of American equity funds: the first focused on institutional investors and the second 
on retail investors. He noted that institutional fund clients used more sophisticated selection 
criteria, such as risk-adjusted return measures (Jensen’s alpha, tracking error, among others) 
and were less sensitive to expenses and fees charged by the fund. This was possibly due to the 
fact that economies of scale provided institutional investors with more access to the services of 
management experts, and reduced the costs of looking for investment opportunities and access 
to diversified portfolios.
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
3.1. the sample
Due to regulatory issues, Brazil has a unique data set on the portfolio allocation in hedge funds. 
This information is (compulsorily) provided monthly by all hedge funds while this reporting 
standard is not observed in other countries with well-developed hedge fund industries, such as 
the United Kingdom or the United States. Our sample period is from January 2010 (the oldest 
data available in the database given that before this time Economatica® did not register this 
information precisely) to December 2015. It is restricted to the 352 Brazilian hedge funds that 
charge performance fees, since this research evaluates the possible relation between opacity and 
investors and managers value creation within the context of these funds. Exactly 332 hedge funds 
are currently active and 20 are inactive, all of them listed on the Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CVM). Among these 352 Brazilian hedge funds (also called multimarket funds 
according to Joaquim and Moura (2011)), 309 were classified as Strategy; 37 as Allocation and 
6 as Investment Abroad in line with the Anbima’s Classification1.
It is important to highlight that Brazilian hedge funds differ from US hedge funds in some 
aspects such as: i) regulation (Brazilian hedge funds face stricter legal regulation); ii) liquidity (US 
hedge funds present a 3 to 6 monthlockup period, while,in Brazil, hedge funds present general 
daily liquidity ); iii) categories divisions (US hedge funds are more varied and specialized than 
Brazilian ones); iv) derivatives investments (in Brazil, the derivative market is less diversified and 
liquid ) (Petersen, 2007). 
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Only open-end funds composed of non-exclusive and non-restricted shares were selected. The 
analysis was conducted on three segments of hedge funds. According to CVM (2014), the first one 
refers to non-qualified investors, investments lower than BRL 1,000,000.00 (approximately US$ 
298,0002) and does not require a qualification certificate. The second segment refers to qualified 
investors, investments superior to BRL 1,000,000.00 and a qualification certificate. The third 
segment is composed of professional investors with professional certifications and investments 
over BRL 10,000,000.00 (approximately US$ 2,980,000). In accordance with these qualification 
levels, our sample is composed of 352 funds as follows: 115 directed at professional and qualified 
investors (32.67% of the sample) and 237 directed at retail investors (67.33% of the sample).
This segmentation is based on Sato (2014) who claims that the increase in the fund’s opacity 
could affect different investors (according to their qualification level). Probably, retail investors do 
not have much access to information related to portfolio composition and would consequently 
have more difficulties in evaluating their fund’s risk.
3.2. empirical mODels
Aiming to verify if opacity creates value for investors and for managers, we analyzed the relation 
between the derivatives usage and the following variables: i) risk level (expressed by Models 1 
to 4); ii)  investor remuneration (presented in Models 5 and 6) and iii) the manager’s income 
(represented by Model 7). Each analysis is presented in distinct subsections below3.
3.2.1. Models regarding investor’s risk
Based on the models proposed by Chen (2011), Opazo, Raddatz and Schmukler (2015) 
and Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2008), our Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 (M-1, M-2, M-3 and M-4, 
respectively) are expressed as:
M-1 
where, in M-1, σrisk  is measured as σtotal and the dependent variable becomes:
 = variation of the fund’s i monthly total risk, in month m (Chen, 2011, p. 
1097). This variable is calculated as:
( )2 , ,  ,
1
1  21
1
n
total i m i d i m
d
r r
n
σ
=
= − ×
− ∑
 (1)
The variable ri,d represents the return of fund i, on day d, while ,i mr  is the daily mean return 
of fund i. We consider 21 business days in each month. 
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In M-2, σrisk is measured as σsystematic and the dependent variable becomes:
systematic ,
systematic , 1
 i m
i m
σ
σ −
= variation of the fund’s i monthly systematic risk, for month m (as suggested 
by Chen, 2011, p. 1097). Since fund managers (mainly the better informed ones) can enhance 
their fund´s performance through leverage (Chen, 2011, p.1075), the systematic risk could be 
associated with derivatives usage. Derivatives amplify the exposure of funds to market factors 
such as exchange rate risk, interest rate fluctuation, or stocks (by margin deposits, as is the case 
of future contracts, or even paying a premium value, as in the case of options). The systematic 
risk is measured using the same procedures employed by Alexander (2008, p. 11), over beta 
estimation as pointed out in Chen (2011), since its calculation includes the covariance matrix 
of the risk factors returns. In this paper, we  measure the exposure of funds to the following risk 
factors: foreign currency (dollar and euro exchange rates), domestic stock index market returns 
(Ibovespa return and domestic Carhart (1997) factors), domestic bonds (Ima-geral, Ida-geral), 
domestic commodities price index (Icb), domestic inflation rate (Ipca) and domestic interest rate 
(Cdi-over).This set of variables is similar to those considered by Bali Brown and Caglayan (2011) 
but it takes into account their adjustment to the Brazilian market.
M-3 is defined by σnon-systematic and the dependent variable becomes:
nonsystematic ,
nonsystematic , 1
 i m
i m
σ
σ −
= variation of the fund’s i monthly nonsystematic risk and is computed between 
the difference of total and systematic risk.
M-4 is given by:
 
M-4
where:
 = variation of the fund’s i monthly tracking error risk, for month m 
(BASAK; PAVLOVA;SHAPIRO, 2008). This variable is calculated as follows:
( )2  , ,  ,  
1
1  21
1
n
tracking error i m i d i d
d
r rbench
n
σ
=
= − ×
− ∑    (2)
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The variable ri,d represents the return of fund i, on day d, while rbenchi,d  is the daily return of 
the fund’ benchmark (employed as reference for the performance calculation). 
A description of all the independent variables of each model is presented in Table 1.
3.2.2. Models regarding investor’s return
Does the strategy to increase fund risk really raise the investor’s adjusted return? Models 5 and 
6 (M-5 and M-6, respectively) are proposed to assess this relationship. While M-4 is focused on 
monthly adjusted return (measured by the adjusted Sharpe ratio), M-6 refers to an annual return. 
These models test if opaque assets (derivatives) are related to short and long term adjusted 
return. M-5 and M-6 are based on Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Do, Faff and Wickramanayake 
(2005) and Soydemir, Smolarski and Shin (2014):
M-5
M-6
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Table 1 
Description of the independent variables (M-1 to M-7)
Model
Variables M-1 M-2 M-3 M-4 M-5 M-6 M-7 Theoretical Background
ΔFutci,m: variation of the 
monthly percentage invested 
in future contracts by fund i in 
month m, where ΔFutci,m,y = 
Futci,m,y - Futci,m-1,y.
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √  
According to Chen (2011) 
managers can employ 
derivatives for speculative or 
hedging purposes, which can 
affect the risk assumed by fund 
in the long term.
ΔForwci,m: variation of the 
monthly percentage invested 
in forward contracts by fund i 
in month m, where ΔForwci,m,y 
= Forwci,m,y - Forwci,m-1,y.
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √  
ΔOpti,m: variation of the 
monthly percentage invested 
in option by fund i in month 
m, where ΔOpti,m,y = Opti,m,y 
- Opti,m-1,y 
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √  
ΔSwapi,m: variation of the 
monthly percentage invested 
in swaps by fund i in month 
m, where ΔSwapi,m,y = Swapi,m,y 
- Swapi,m-1,y.
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √  
Dmangi: dummy regarding 
the type of the relation 
between the fund’s 
administrator and manager. 
It is 0 if both belong to the 
same financial group and 1 
otherwise. 
√  √  √  √  √  √  
As suggested by Iquiapaza 
(2009) it is important to 
verify if the manager and the 
administrator belong to the 
same financial group (since it 
would contribute to conflict of 
interest problems), which would 
affect the funds’ performance.
ri,m: monthly percentage return 
obtained by fund i, in month 
m.
√  √  √  √  
Opazo, Raddatz and Schmukler 
(2015) employed both variables 
to explain the fund’s risk 
changing. The variable ri,m-1 
was also employed by Agarwal, 
Daniel and  Naik (2009) 
to verify the impact of past 
performance on present return..
ri,m-1: monthly percentage 
return obtained by fund i, in 
month m-1.
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √  
Dlevergi: dummy equal to 1 
if fund i is allowed to adopt 
leverage strategies and equal to 
0 otherwise.
√  √  √  √  √  √  √  
Chen (2011) used this dummy 
as a proxy for funds that are 
able or not to use derivatives for 
speculative purposes.
Sizei,m: natural logarithm of 
the fund’s net worth in month 
m.
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √ † 
Employed by Edwards and 
Caglayan (2001),  Do, Faff and 
Wickramanayake (2005), and  
Soydemir, Smolarski and Shin 
(2014) as a factor to explain the 
hedge fund performance.
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Model
Variables M-1 M-2 M-3 M-4 M-5 M-6 M-7 Theoretical Background
Agei,m: natural logarithm 
of the difference between 
the current date (or the 
liquidation date, if the fund 
ends before the last data in our 
sample period) and the fund’s 
opening date.
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √  
According to Brown; Harlow 
and Starks (1996) younger 
funds invest more in risky 
assets, trying to get a better 
performance, mainly when they 
do not have a long return time 
series. It was also employed by 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001) 
in their study of hedge funds’ 
return.
Dbenchi: dummy equal to 1 if 
fund i is below the benchmark 
(the reference index used to 
calculate the performance fee) 
and 0, otherwise.
√  
According to Basak, Pavlova 
and Shapiro (2008) risk 
management practices also 
account for benchmarking. 
Dcati: dummies representing 
the three Anbima’s (Brazilian 
Association of Financial 
Market Institutions) 
classifications of funds 
such as “Strategy” (Dcat1i), 
“Allocation” (Dcat2i) 
and “Investment abroad” 
(Dcat3i)**.
√  √  √  √  √  √  √  
Chen (2011) grouped the funds 
according to their categories 
in their risk and performance 
analyses
Dyeari: dummies representing 
each year of the sample (time 
fixed effect). 
√  √  √  √  √  √  √  
It was an effort to capture the 
effect of high volatilities periods 
occurred in Brazil, which would 
affect our analysis
Rfm: In terms of “risk factors” 
the following variables are 
considered (in monthly 
periods
√  √  √  √  √  √ * √  
It is in accordance with Bali, 
Brown and Caglayan (2011): 
stocks (Ibrx-100m , Ibovespam 
and Carhart(1997) factors); 
government bonds (ima-geral 
m); corporate bonds (Ida-
Geralm); domestic interest rates 
(Cdi-overm; Selic-overm); foreign 
currency (dollar (Dolm) and 
euro (Eur m) exchange rates); 
commodities price (Icb m); and 
inflation (Ipca m).
Size2 i,m: the inverse of the 
natural logarithm of the value 
of fund assets in month m.
√  √ *
Factor used by Edwards and 
Caglayan (2001) for capturing 
the possible non-linear relation 
between performance and 
fund’s size.
MangFeei: management fee 
charged by fund i (percentage 
of net worth).
√  √  √  
Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
highlight that funds which 
decrease their manager fees in 
a particular period are more 
prone to grow faster.
Table 1 
Cont.
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Model
Variables M-1 M-2 M-3 M-4 M-5 M-6 M-7 Theoretical Background
Smbi,m: return of the low 
market capitalization stock 
portfolio minus the return of 
the high market capitalization 
stock portfolio for fund i in 
month m.
√  √ *
Fama and French (1993) 
employed this factor to estimate 
hedge fund returns. 
Premiumi,m: return of the 
domestic stock market 
portfolio (Ibovespa) minus the 
return of the domestic risk-free 
asset (Cdi-over) for fund i in 
month m.
√  √ *
Fama and French (1993) 
employed this factor to estimate 
hedge fund returns.
Hmli,m: return of a stock 
portfolio with a high ratio 
of accounting value / market 
value minus the return of a 
stock portfolio with a low ratio 
of accounting value / market 
value for fund i in month m.
√  √  *
Fama and French (1993) 
employed this factor to estimate 
hedge fund returns.
Wmli,my: return of a winner 
stock portfolio less the return 
of a loser stock portfolio for 
fund i in month m.
√  √ *
Fama and French (1993) 
employed this factor to estimate 
hedge fund returns.
cmreti,y-1: annual return of 
fund i in year y-1. √  
This variable aims to capture the 
effect of past return on present 
return as observed by Agarwal, 
Daniel and Naik (2009).
Volreti,m: standard deviation 
of the fund i’s daily return 
in month m and year y 
multiplied by √ 21.
√  
Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) 
observed that the funds’ flows 
could be impacted by the funds’ 
return volatility. 
r2i,m-1: monthly squared return 
obtained by fund i in month 
m-1.
√  
As stated by Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) and by  Huang, Wei and 
Yan (2007), the funds’ flows are 
non-linear related with their 
past performance. Those with 
recently better  performance 
suffer higher inflows while those 
with worse return suffer lower 
outflows.
Dloseri,m-1: performance 
dummy equal to 1 if the fund’s 
monthly return lagged in 1 
month is in the group of loser 
funds (those with return lower 
than or equal to percentile 
20), and 0, otherwise.
√  
As stated by Huang, Wei and 
Yan (2007) these dummies 
would be helpful for the 
estimation of non-linear 
relations between funds’ flow 
and performance.
Table 1 
Cont.
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Model
Variables M-1 M-2 M-3 M-4 M-5 M-6 M-7 Theoretical Background
Dmidi,m-1: performance 
dummy equal to 1 if the 
fund’s monthly return lagged 
in 1 month in the group of 
middle funds (those with 
return lower than 80 or higher 
than percentile 20), and 0, 
otherwise.
√  
As stated by Huang, Wei and 
Yan (2007) these dummies 
would be helpful for the 
estimation of non-linear 
relations between funds’ flow 
and performance.
Dwini,m-1: performance 
dummy equal to 1 if the 
fund’s monthly return lagged 
in 1 month, is in the group 
of loser funds (those with 
return higher than or equal 
to percentile 80), and 0, 
otherwise.
√  
As stated by Huang, Wei and 
Yan (2007) these dummies 
would be helpful for the 
estimation of non-linear 
relations between funds’ flow 
and performance.
* indicates annual frequency. † indicates lagged in one month.
**The “Strategy” classification includes funds whose operations follow the strategies selected by manager. All of 
them allow leverage. The “Allocation” classification encompasses funds directed to long-term return. Some of them 
can have leverage operations. The “Investment abroad” classification considers funds that invest more than 40% of 
their net worth in assets that are traded abroad. All of them allow leverage operations.
Source: Elaborated by authors.
Table 1 
Cont.
Since there is empirical evidence that hedge funds return distributions are often asymmetric, 
our dependent variable in these two models is the adjusted Sharpe ratio proposed in Koenig 
(2004, p. 44). The additional variables included in M-5 and M-6 are:
Dasri,m = the difference between the Sharpe Adjusted Ratio in months m and m-1 for fund i..
Dasri,y= the difference between the adjusted Sharpe ratio between years y and y-1 for fund i.
The independent variables of M-5 and M-6 are described in Table 1. The risk factors (variable 
Rfm,y) are the same ones used in Models 1 (M-1) to 4 (M-4).
3.2.3 Models regarding managers remuneration
The manager could raise the portfolio’s risk aiming to inflate the return, to increase the fund’s 
net worth, and consequently receive more benefits (due to the fact that the performance fee is 
calculated based on this amount). Thus, it is important to check if investments in derivatives are 
positively correlated with this net worth’s increment. This is investigated by means of Model 7 
(M-7). Following Ferreira et al. (2012), the variation in the net worth is calculated as: 
( ), , 1 ,
,
, 1
1i m i m i m
i m
i m
Nw Nw r
Flow
Nw
−
−
 − × + =  (3)
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where: 
Flow i,m = variation of the fund’s net worth for month m ;
Nwi,m,= fund i’s net worth for month m;
Nwi,m-1= fund i’s net worth for month m-1;
ri,m= log monthly return obtained by fund i, in month m.
The variables in Model 7 were selected in line with the factors used in Sirri and Tufano (1998), 
Greene and Hodges (2002), Agarwal and Naik (2004), Schiozer and Tejerina (2013), Cashman 
et al. (2014) and Berggrun and Lizarzaburu (2015):
 
M-7
A description of all the independent variables in this model is presented in Table 1. The three 
performance dummies (Dloseri,m-1, Dmidi,m-1 and Dwini,m-1) were included in M-7 in order 
to investigate if the fund’s relative return (compared to its peers) would affect the net worth’s 
variation as stated by Berks and Tonks (2007).
Before estimating the models, we ran collinearity and stationarity tests. Then, all  models 
were calculated using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The GMM estimator can 
simultaneously address the main problems of endogeneity, which is commonly found in research 
with observational data.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. summary statistics
Since GMM models present estimators that are easily influenced by outliers, as pointed out 
by Lucas, Dijk and Kloek (2009), we winsorize our data by adjusting the values below and above 
percentiles 1 and 99, respectively, of the total sample distribution. The basic statistics computed 
for the dependent variables (from M-1 to M-7) are detailed as follows:
As for the monthly total risk (measured by the standard deviation of daily returns multiplied 
by ), the systematic risk, and the tracking error, Table 2 shows that, based on the mean and 
the median, the funds aimed at professional investors are the riskier ones. In contrast to the 
adjusted Sharpe ratio, by observing the quantiles and the mean, one can note that the funds 
directed at non-qualified investors offer a lower risk-adjusted return than those offered to the 
non-retail public. 
 Furthermore, funds for non-qualified investors have lower values of net flows (based on the 
1st quantile, mean and the median observations). 
The summary statistics concerning the percentage of the funds’ net worth invested in derivatives 
(opaque assets) are reported in Table 3:
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for the dependent variables (after winsorization)
Investor 
Type Variable Minimum
1st 
Quartile Median Mean
3rd 
Quartile
Standard 
Deviation Maximum
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l
Monthly Total Risk 0.00041 0.00366 0.00773 0.01286 0.01660 0.01399 0.07530
Monthly Systematic 
Risk 0.00025 0.00287 0.00606 0.00986 0.01291 0.01105 0.06660
Monthly Non-
Systematic Risk 0.00001 0.00048 0.00113 0.00164 0.00216 0.00173 0.00920
Monthly Tracking 
Error Risk 0.00029 0.00361 0.00768 0.01257 0.01608 0.01381 0.07531
Monthly Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio -4.50 -0.41 0.45 3.58 1.03 19.14 176.10
Annual Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio -8.34 -0.81 0.19 8.26 1.76 48.81 366.23
Monthly Net Flow 
(In Thousand Reais) -83438 -452.50 0.67 351.1 225.70 19.381 84.365
Q
ua
lifi
ed
Monthly Total Risk 0.00002 0.00244 0.00589 0.01057 0.01272 0.01399 0.07775
Monthly Systematic 
Risk 0.00001 0.00184 0.00479 0.00885 0.01023 0.01230 0.07029
Monthly Non-
Systematic Risk 0.00000 0.00028 0.00084 0.00171 0.00208 0.00235 0.01263
Monthly Tracking 
Error Risk 0.000001 0.00231 0.00583 0.01010 0.01259 0.01301 0.07589
Monthly Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio -5.93 -0.69 0.12 1.17 1.39 7.81 66.36
Annual Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio -11.58 -0.79 -0.04 1.49 1.26 9.43 74.17
Monthly Net Flow 
(In Thousand Reais) -85953 -1747 0.05 -1.171 357 16.264 69.183
N
on
-Q
ua
lifi
ed
Monthly Total Risk 0.00012 0.00326 0.00650 0.00906 0.01187 0.00852 0.04486
Monthly Systematic 
Risk 0.00008 0.00242 0.00497 0.00738 0.00952 0.00752 0.04063
Monthly Non-
Systematic Risk 0.00004 0.00040 0.00110 0.00297 0.00366 0.00437 0.02320
Monthly Tracking 
Error Risk 0.00001 0.00315 0.00635 0.00895 0.01168 0.00867 0.04644
Monthly Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio -4.9 -0.81 -0.04 0.06 0.82 1.83 5.67
Annual Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio -6.90 -0.90 -0.12 0.43 0.76 3.77 28.43
Monthly Net Flow 
(In Thousand Reais) -82.473 -3.303 -230 -1.231 352 18.115 83.713
This table reports the summary statistics for the dependent variables of Models 1 to 6 according to the investors’ 
qualification level. To treat outliers’ presence, all the data was winsorized considering extreme values below percentile 
1 and above percentile 99. 
Source: Elaborated by authors.
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Table 3 
Basic Statics related to the funds’ net worth invested in opaque assets (derivatives) after winsorization
Number of funds
Investor Variable (as a percentage of net worth) Minimum 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Maximum Percentage > Mean
Percentage 
<= Mean
Pr
of
es
sio
na
l
Future Market-Short Position -14.280% -0.129% 0.000% -0.612% 0.038% 27.800% 16 10
Future Market-Long Position -4.423% -0.023% 0.000% 0.705% 0.111% 23.680% 6 20
Call Option –Sellers Position  -8.886% -0.107% 0.000% -0.304% 0.000% 0.000% 14 12
Call Option –Buyers Position  0.000% 0.000% 0.056% 0.607% 0.311% 12.820% 8 18
Put Option –Sellers Position  -3.506% -0.145% -0.018% -0.185% 0.000% 0.000% 11 15
Put Option –Buyers Position  0.000% 0.000% 0.058% 0.349% 0.288% 6.718% 7 19
Swap to pay -11.810% -0.029% 0.000% -0.189% 0.000% 0.000% 9 17
Swap receivable 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.490% 0.146% 11.280% 8 18
Forward- Purchases receivables -1.071% 0.000% 0.000% 0.470% 0.043% 61.840% 8 18
Forward - Sales receivables -2.608% 0.000% 0.000% 0.803% 0.306% 18.120% 5 21
Q
ua
lifi
ed
Future Market-Short Position -14.280% -0.048% 0.000% 0.702% 0.127% 30.890% 9 80
Future Market-Long Position -4.423% -0.015% 0.000% 0.640% 0.104% 23.680% 13 76
Call Option –Sellers Position  -8.886% -0.394% -0.069% -0.519% 0.000% 0.000% 41 48
Call Option –Buyers Position  0.000% 0.000% 0.150% 1.032% 0.881% 12.820% 30 59
Put Option –Sellers Position  0.000% -4.315% -0.185% -0.031% -0.296% 0.000% 49 40
Put Option –Buyers Position  0.000% 0.000% 0.068% 0.464% 0.398% 6.8700% 23 66
Swap to pay -38.050% -0.028% 0.000% -0.149% 0.000% 0.000% 30 59
Swap receivable 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.396% 0.069% 57.320% 16 73
Forward- Purchases receivables -0.584% 0.000% 0.000% 0.173% 0.000% 17.400% 25 64
Forward - Sales receivables -3.874% 0.000% 0.000% 0.808% 0.061% 49.590% 17 72
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Number of funds
Investor Variable (as a percentage of net worth) Minimum 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Maximum Percentage > Mean
Percentage 
<= Mean
N
on
-Q
ua
lifi
ed
Future Market-Short Position -14.280% -0.052% 0.000% 0.508% 0.070% 30.890% 17 220
Future Market-Long Position -4.423% -0.010% 0.000% 0.549% 0.051% 23.680% 33 204
Call Option –Sellers Position  -8.886% -0.226% -0.014% -0.421% 0.000% 0.000% 151 86
Call Option –Buyers Position  0.000% 0.000% 0.028% 0.660% 0.359% 12.820% 72 165
Put Option –Sellers Position  0.000% -4.315% -0.112% -0.001% -0.196% 0.000% 127 110
Put Option –Buyers Position  0.000% 0.000% 0.011% 0.379% 0.226% 6.870% 74 163
Swap to pay -39.860% 0.000% 0.000% -0.206% 0.000% 0.000% 129 108
Swap receivable 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.538% 0.000% 50.600% 35 202
Forward- Purchases receivables -23.130% 0.000% 0.000% 0.146% 0.000% 72.720% 68 169
Forward - Sales receivables -5.096% 0.000% 0.000% 0.546% 0.000% 60.270% 44 193
To treat outliers’ presence, all the data was winsorized considering extreme values below percentile 1 and above percentile 99.The negative percentages are related to: i) values to 
be paid; ii) negative adjustments of buyers or sellers positions; iii) option sale operations (these transactions are registered with a negative sign in the monthly portfolio balance 
sheet because, despite leading to cash inflows, they may also result in potential obligations). 
Source: Elaborated by authors. 
Table 3 
Cont.
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In summary, it can be observed (see Table 3) that managers of funds directed to less qualified 
investors employ lower mean levels of derivative contracts compared to funds focused on qualified 
and professional investors, which can also be inferred based on the results in Table 2 (since these 
last two classes presented the higher risk levels). Furthermore, as shown in Table 2, the risk 
premium received by non-qualified investors is lower than that received by the qualified group, 
which could harm their wealth in the long run.
4.2. results
The variation of the fund’s net worth value invested in derivatives in month m, year y 
(ΔDerivi,m,y) is calculated as the sum of the positions in four markets: swaps, future and 
forward contracts, and options. Additionally, the models were calculated based on two criteria. 
First, a  variable was estimated in absolute terms according to the assumption that the higher 
the absolute value, the greater the degree of the portfolio’s opacity regardless of the derivative 
usage for hedging or for speculative purposes. This reflects the fact that managers can increase 
the fund´s opacity for retail investors through the purchase of assets characterized by complex 
cash flow structures (SATO, 2014; CÉLÉRIER; VALLÉE, 2013). 
However, as stated by Chen (2011), managers can engage in multiple operations using derivatives 
with the intention of hedging the fund’s net worth against market risks, acting on a long or 
short position. Consequently, the net values obtained through the interaction of both strategies 
expresses how much managers invested in derivatives, with the real intention of increasing the 
fund’s risk. To model this behavior, we adopteda second criterion, which uses only net values 
calculated as the difference between the amount invested in buyers and sellers’ positions in swaps, 
options, future and forward contracts. 
The results are presented in three distinct subsections, each one exploring the main findings 
regarding investor’s risk and return and manager’s remuneration. For every model described in 
Section 3.2, we use the dependent lagged variable as an instrument based on the Arellano–Bond 
estimator, as suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.765). The authors also stated that the 
use of lagged regressors is an additional procedure for softening the problem of endogeneity, if 
it is reasonable to admit a null correlation between this and the error term. Furthermore, factors 
that were not initially included in the model, but that were considered significant instruments 
by the Sargan test are also employed. For all models, the null hypothesis is assessed at the 5% 
significance level. Consequently, we can infer that the linear specification of all equations is 
correct, and the set of instruments4 chosen was not correlated with the error term.
Also, regarding the Arellano & Bond test, for all the estimated equations in this study, we found 
evidence at the 5% significance level that the null hypothesis of zero auto correlation could not 
be rejected for the lagged superior levels of differenced idiosyncratic error term.
4.2.1. Results regarding investors risk
The results presented in Table 4 show the relations between the dependent variables (risk 
shifting in monthly terms) and the main independent variable (the variation of the total percentage 
of fund’s net worth invested in derivatives, in absolute (ΔDerivi,m,y (absolute) and net terms 
ΔDerivi,m,y (net)).
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Table 4 
Relation between the risk variables and the variation of derivatives in absolute and net terms
Panel A : Derivatives  
in Absolute Terms
Panel B : Derivatives  
in Net Terms
Models Type of Derivative
Total Qualified Non-qualified Total Qualified
Non-
qualified
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
M-1: Variation 
of the Monthly 
Total Risk
ΔDerivi,m 
0.00353***
(0.00090)
0.00282**
(0.00141)
0.00391***
(0.00111)
0.00729***
(0.00198)
0.00755**
(0.00309)
0.00685***
(0.00201)
ΔDerivi,m-1 
0.00320***
(0.00086)
0.00390*
(0.00144)
0.00284***
(0.00095)
0.00386**
(0.00176)
0.00388
(0.00282)
0.00416**
(0.00173)
M-2: Variation 
of the Monthly 
Systematic Risk
ΔDerivi,m 
0.01021***
(0.00167)
0.00336**
(0.00134)
0.00395***
(0.00101)
0.03639***
(0.00567)
0.00816***
(0.00285)
0.00744***
(0.00210)
ΔDerivi,m-1 
0.00548***
(0.00080)
0.00428***
(0.00137)
0.00272***
(0.00100)
0.00935***
(0.00203)
0.00265
(0.00234)
0.00261
(0.00192)
M-3: Variation 
of the Monthly 
Non-Systematic 
Risk
ΔDerivi,m 
0.00304**
(0.00103)
0.00381**
(0.00184)
0.00194
(0.00147)
0.00282
(0.00257)
0.00700*
(0.00396)
0.00040
(0.00266)
ΔDerivi,m-1 
0.00534***
(0.12953)
0.00662***
(0.00205)
0.00457***
(0.00099)
0.01075***
( 0.00227)
0.01123***
(0.00422)
0.01026***
(0.00234)
M-4: Variation 
of the Monthly 
Tracking Error
ΔDerivi,m 
0.00329***
(0.00329)
0.00343***
(0.00131)
0.00338***
(0.00080)
0.00656***
(0.00143)
0.00749***
(0.00264)
0.00616***
(0.00163)
ΔDerivi,m-1 
0.00324***
(0.00066)
0.00364***
(0.00131)
0.00271***
(0.00080)
0.00377***
(0.00127)
0.00302
(0.00241)
0.00361**
(0.00153)
Table 4 considers the derivatives percentage in absolute and net terms as well as the total sample and its subsets 
(according to investors’ qualification level).
Total sample: 18,259 monthly observations/ Qualified investors sample: 5,560 monthly observations / Non-qualified 
investors sample: 12,699 monthly observations.
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.
***Significant at the 1% level/**Significant at the 5% level/*Significant at the 10% level.
ΔDerivi,m-1(absolute)= ΔFutci,m (absolute) + ΔForwci,m (absolute)+ ΔOpti,m (absolute)+ ΔSwapi,m (absolute)
ΔDerivi,m-1,y(net)= ΔFutci,m (net) + ΔForwci,m (net)+ ΔOpti,m (net)+ ΔSwapi,m (net)
Source: Elaborated by authors.
In general, there is a significant positive relationship between the variation of the fund’s net 
worth percentage invested in derivatives (in absolute terms) and the increment in total risk, 
systematic and non-systematic risk, and the tracking error of the portfolio, even when the sample 
is segmented into qualified and non-qualified investors. 
We also tested the individual significance of the derivatives markets (swap, future and forward 
contracts and options). The results are shown in Table 5:
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Table 5 
Relation between risk variables and the net worth percentage invested in derivatives 
Panel A: Derivatives in Absolute Terms Panel B: Derivatives in Net Terms
Model Type of Derivative
Total Qualified Non-Qualified Total Qualified
Non-
Qualified
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
M
-1
: V
ar
ia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
M
on
th
ly
 T
ot
al
 R
isk
ΔFutci,m, 
0.00100
(0.00093)
0.00221
(0.00187)
0.00130
(0.00127)
0.00639***
(0.00216)
0.00676
(0.00498)
0.00709*
(0.00381)
ΔFutci,m-1 
0.00509***
(0.00092)
0.00521***
(0.00157)
0.00492***
(0.00100)
0.01168***
(0.00243)
0.00939*
(0.00526)
0.01160***
(0.00243)
ΔSwapi,m 
0.12237***
(0.01429)
0.10271***
(0.02246)
0.06800***
(0.01838)
0.08773***
(0.01954)
0.11226**
(0.03378)
0.06230**
(0.02597)
ΔSwapi,m-1 
-0.02633**
(0.01049)
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.01854*
(0.01032)
-0.07718***
(0.01545)
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.05071***
(0.01443)
ΔOpti,m 
0.05997***
(0.00706)
0.01125***
(0.00375)
0.01646***
(0.00242)
0.08576***
(0.01236)
0.01947**
(0.00761)
0.03922***
(0.00701)
ΔOpti,m-1 
0.01556***
(0.00270)
0.00398
(0.00330)
0.01186***
(0.00253)
0.01531***
(0.00525)
0.00198
(0.00604)
0.02162***
(0.00569)
ΔForwci,m 
0.00081
(0.00322)
0.00354
(0.00477)
0.00130
(0.00401)
0.00348
(0.00316)
0.00293
(0.00482)
0.00282
(0.00410)
ΔForwci,m,-1
-0.00043
(0.00404)
0.00647
(0.00503)
-0.00477
(0.00546)
-0.00155
(0.00388)
0.00482
(0.00507)
-0.00462
(0.00544)
M
-2
: V
ar
ia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
M
on
th
ly
 S
ys
te
m
at
ic
 R
isk
ΔFutci,m 
0.00238**
(0.00100)
0.00222
(0.00178)
0.00207
(0.00126)
0.01668***
(0.00514)
0.00821
(0.00501)
0.00524
(0.00323)
ΔFutci,m-1 
0.00560***
(0.00108)
0.00667***
(0.00210)
0.00511***
(0.00138)
0.01419***
(0.00358)
0.01276***
(0.00493)
0.01029***
(0.00273)
ΔSwapi,m 
0.10180***
(0.01648)
0.15612
(0.02816)
0.08428***
(0.02198)
0.13269***
(0.02380)
0.17103***
(0.03762)
0.10077***
(0.03102)
ΔSwapi,m-1 
Inserted as 
instrument
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.01803
(0.01541)
Inserted as 
instrument
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.05542***
(0.0202685)
ΔOpti,m 
0.01814***
(0.00240)
0.01413***
(0.00482)
0.01719***
(0.00604)
0.03907**
(0.00572)
0.02413***
(0.00823)
0.06152***
(0.01769)
ΔOpti,m-1 
Inserted as 
instrument
0.00443
(0.00478)
0.01179***
(0.00300)
Inserted as 
instrument
0.00095
(0.00771)
0.03202***
(0.00681)
ΔForwci,m 
-0.00077
(0.00355)
-0.00358
(0.00563)
0.00015
(0.00468)
0.00114
(0.00349)
-0.00031
(0.00555)
0.00148
(0.00466)
ΔForwci,m,-1 
-0.00809*
(0.00441)
0.00023
(0.00617)
-0.01346**
(0.00632)
-0.00838**
(0.00427)
0.00001
(0.00648)
-0.01431**
(0.00622)
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Panel A: Derivatives in Absolute Terms Panel B: Derivatives in Net Terms
M
-3
: V
ar
ia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
M
on
th
ly
 N
on
-S
ys
te
m
at
ic
 R
isk ΔFutci,m
0.00435***
(0.00155)
0.00237
(0.00256)
-0.00097
(0.00216)
0.01632**
(0.00662)
0.01131
(0.00857)
-0.00139
(0.00589)
ΔFutci,m-1
0.00592***
(0.00136)
0.00960***
(0.00329)
0.00241**
(0.00115)
0.02152***
(0.00598)
0.03371**
(0.01408)
0.01502***
(0.00457)
ΔSwapi,m
0.01024
(0.02513)
0.06491**
(0.02952)
-0.03220
(0.02772)
-0.03367
(0.02742)
0.02980
(0.03721)
-0.09107***
(0.03217)
ΔSwapi,m-1
0.03184
(0.021112)
-0.02241
(0.02833)
0.04890**
(0.02214)
0.01324
(0.0288)
-0.06435
(0.05825)
0.04542***
(0.02641)
ΔOpti,m
0.00285
(0.00338)
-0.00135
(0.00552)
0.00445
(0.00417)
0.00981
(0.00735)
0.00448
(0.01217)
0.00860*
(0.00988)
ΔOpti,m-1
0.00845**
(0.00393)
0.00390
(0.00810)
0.01181**
(0.00475)
0.00593
(0.00836)
0.00365
(0.01327)
0.00833
(0.01036)
ΔForwci,m
0.00131
(0.00485)
0.01190*
(0.00715)
0.00081**
(0.00624)
0.00242
(0.00496)
0.01115
(0.00789)
0.00254
(0.00615)
ΔForwci,m,-1
0.01225**
(0.00502)
0.01471***
(0.00536)
0.01688**
(0.00730)
0.01399***
(0.00509)
0.01458***
(0.00545)
0.01995***
(0.00715)
M
-4
: V
ar
ia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
M
on
th
ly
 T
ra
ck
in
g 
Er
ro
r
ΔFutci,m 
0.00387
(0.00123)
0.00148
(0.00199)
0.00144
(0.00116)
0.01425***
(0.00478)
0.00415
(0.00575)
0.00597**
(0.00285)
ΔFutci,m-1 
0.00685
(0.00103)
0.00791***
(0.00158)
0.00498***
(0.00112)
0.01710***
(0.00348)
0.02178***
(0.00594)
0.01000***
(0.00228)
ΔSwapi,m 
0.08612
(0.01377)
0.14965***
(0.02537)
0.08470***
(0.01771)
0.11622***
(0.01956)
0.14676***
(0.03413)
0.07682***
(0.02378)
ΔSwapi,m-1 
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.04753***
(0.01677)
-0.02024*
(0.01141)
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.10687***
(0.02802)
-0.04361***
(0.01415)
ΔOpti,m 
0.01342***
(0.0021418)
0.01039**
(0.00395)
0.01657***
(0.00271)
0.03207***
(0.00531)
0.02003**
(0.00780)
0.04036***
(0.00715)
ΔOpti,m-1 
0.01121***
(0.00215)
0.00448
(0.004088)
0.01263***
(0.00283)
0.01691***
(0.00426)
0.00219
(0.00712)
0.023701***
(0.00581)
ΔForwci,m 
-2.51E-05
(0.00324)
0.00263
(0.00528)
-0.00078
(0.00422)
0.00038
(0.00310)
0.00238
(0.00570)
0.00082
(0.00422)
ΔForwci,m,-1 
-0.00229
(0.00383)
0.00362
(0.00560)
-0.00524
(0.00537)
-0.00326
(0.00369)
0.00247
(0.00568)
-0.00528
(0.00530)
Dlevergi
-0.01022***
(0.00300)
-0.01597**
(0.006841)
0.00493**
(0.00205)
-0.00798***
(0.00290)
-0.01544**
(0.00701)
0.00380**
(0.00192)
Table 5 considers the derivatives percentage in absolute and net terms as well as the total sample and its 
subsets (according to investors’ qualification level). Total sample: 18,259 monthly observations/ Qual-
ified investors sample: 5,560 monthly observations / Non-qualified investors sample: 12,699 monthly 
observations.
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients. ***Significant at the 1% level/**Significant 
at the 5% level/*Significant at the 10% level. Source: Elaborated by authors.
Table 5 
Cont.
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As observed in M-1 and M-2, the results in Table 5 indicate that higher percentages (of the 
fund’s net worth) invested in swaps, options, and future contracts (in net and absolute terms) 
are mostly still associated with higher variation of total and systematic risk, both for the total 
and the segmented samples (independent of the investors’ qualification level). It is important 
to highlight that swaps presented the higher coefficients. According to Hull (1997) a swap is 
a risky derivative since it involves the possibility of considerable losses, given that the increase 
of the difference between the fees (computed on a notional value considerably higher than the 
amount required as margins) is unlimited, and, generally, the counterparts are obligated to hold 
their positions until the maturity of the contract.
Regarding to M-3, even though the number of significant coefficients were  lower than the 
ones obtained for M-1 and M-2, we also found a positive relation between this risk measure and 
derivatives, in particular for future and forward contracts and swaps (independent of the investors’ 
qualification level). It indicates that derivatives were positively associated with the amount of risk 
not explained by the market (such as human risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk (VARGA; LEAL, 
2006, p.35). The results are in line with Chen (2011) who found that the difference in fund 
risks between derivatives users and nonusers was more substantial for market-related systematic 
risk than for idiosyncratic risk.
However, in accordance with Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2007), managers of lower performance 
funds would amplify the shares volatility when the fund’s return is below the benchmark (increasing 
the tracking error volatility). Therefore, through M-4, it was possible to verify in general a positive 
relation between the percentage invested in swaps, future contracts and options and the tracking 
error variation. It is important to highlight that only for the non-qualified investors’ context, 
the leverage dummy (Dlevergi) is positive, showing that hedge funds that are allowed to have 
leveraged positions will probably present returns that are more distant from the benchmark. 
4.2.2. Results regarding investors return
The results presented in Table 6 show the relations between the dependent variables (adjusted 
Sharpe index variation - in monthly and annual terms) and the main independent variable 
(the variation of the total percentage of fund’s net worth invested in derivatives, in absolute 
(ΔDerivi,m,y (absolute) and net terms ΔDerivi,m,y (net)).
As indicated by M-5, this strategy does not increase the level of monthly adjusted returns 
offered to the investor. When this relation is analyzed in annual terms (M-6) non-significant 
coefficients are observed. Moreover, funds that are able to employ derivatives for leverage purposes 
suffered a decrease in this annual return measure (as indicated by the coefficient of Dlevergi). 
We also tested the individual significance of the derivatives markets (swap, future and forward 
contracts and options). The results are reported in Table 7:
The effect of the share’s volatility on the adjusted returns incurred by managers was assessed 
in Model 5, which investigates the dynamics between the fund’s amounts invested in derivatives 
and the variation of the monthly-adjusted Sharpe ratio (Dasri,m,y). Overall, as showed by Table 7, 
the coefficients point to a negative relation between Dasri,m,y, and the usage of futures and swaps 
(in absolute and net terms for the total and qualified samples) revealing that higher positions in 
these opaque assets reduces the adjusted returns offered to investors on a monthly basis. About 
the annual investor’s adjusted return (M-6), the leverage dummy (Dlevergi) is negative and 
significant in the total and the retail investors’ samples, indicating that funds which can adopt 
derivatives for speculative purposes do not raise this measure. In net terms, swap is significant 
and positive related to qualified investor’s return.
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Table 6 
Relation between the return variables and the variation of derivatives in absolute and net terms
Panel A: Derivatives in Absolute Terms Panel B: Derivatives in Net Terms
Models Type of Derivative
Total Qualified Non-qualified Total Qualified Non-qualified
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
M-5: 
Variation of 
the Monthly 
Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio 
ΔDerivi,m 
-0.02448*
(0.01379)
-0.13704**
(0.05471)
-0.00389
(0.01465)
-0.04849
(0.03205)
-0.30036**
(0.15127)
-0.02075
(0.05937)
ΔDerivi,m-1 
0.00326
(0.01409)
-0.08083***
(0.02931)
-0.00103
(0.00786)
0.04605
(0.03048)
-0.05203
(0.05379)
0.01721
(0.01906)
M-6: 
Variation of 
the Annual 
Adjusted 
Sharpe Ratio 
ΔDerivi,m  
0.02721
(0.02414)
0.00809
(0.03291)
0.04118
(0.06583)
0.03118
(0.03828)
0.01882
(0.04405)
0.02064
(0.17254)
ΔDerivi,m-1 
-0.01913
(0.02822)
-0.02103
(0.06922)
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.05043
(0.05589)
-0.01810
(0.07168)
Inserted as 
instrument
Dlevergi
-0.73683*
(0.37792)
-0.95579
(0.90784)
-0.46772**
(0.19009)
-0.76018*
(0.39384)
-0.76594
(1.04601)
-0.46345***
(0.15817)
Table 6 considers the derivatives percentage in absolute and net terms as well as the total sample and its subsets 
(according to investors’ qualification level).
Total sample: 18,259 monthly observations/ Qualified investors sample: 5,560 monthly observations / Non-qualified 
investors sample: 12,699 monthly observations.
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.
***Significant at the 1% level/**Significant at the 5% level/*Significant at the 10% level.
ΔDerivi,m-1(absolute)= ΔFutci,m (absolute) + ΔForwci,m (absolute)+ ΔOpti,m (absolute)+ ΔSwapi,m (absolute)
ΔDerivi,m-1,y(net)= ΔFutci,m (net) + ΔForwci,m (net)+ ΔOpti,m (net)+ ΔSwapi,m (net)
Source: Elaborated by authors.
4.2.3 Results regarding managers remuneration
Since opacity increases the fund’s risk level but do not normally generate adjusted return 
increment to investors, what is the impact of this decision on the managers’ remuneration? As 
for the variation of the fund’s net flow (M-7), the results in Table 8 indicate that typically no 
significant coefficients were obtained  considering the variation of the total percentage of fund’s 
net worth invested in derivatives, in absolute (ΔDerivi,m,y (absolute) and net terms ΔDerivi,m,y 
(net)):
Because of this low level of significance for the main independent variable (the fund’s net 
worth percentage invested in derivatives), we also tested the individual significance of each of the 
derivatives markets (swap, future and forward contracts and options). The results are reported 
in Table 9.
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Table 7 
Relation between return variables and the net worth percentage invested in derivatives
Panel A: Derivatives in Absolute Terms Panel B: Derivatives in Net Terms
Model Type of Derivative
Total Qualified Non-Qualified Total Qualified Non-Qualified
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
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ΔFutci,m 
-0.02035
(0.01333)
-0.03831
(0.04337)
-0.00781
(0.00862)
0.04857
(0.04800)
-0.04856
(0.12704)
-0.042648
(0.03871)
ΔFutci,m-1 
-0.04083**
(0.01600)
-0.10414**
(0.05299)
-0.00988
(0.01070)
-0.05074*
(0.02632)
-0.21016*
(0.12359)
-0.020067
(0.02582)
ΔSwapi,m 
-0.87056***
(0.28520)
-2.64574***
(0.83247)
-0.05779
(0.09078)
-2.50219**
(1.17828)
-2.44775***
(0.63485)
0.09418
(0.17612)
ΔSwapi,m-1 
0.01520
(0.18428)
0.28045
(0.47607)
-0.05573
(0.11623)
Inserted as 
instrument
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.00740
(0.1381389)
ΔOpti,m 
0.06878
(0.06089)
0.21624*
(0.11587)
0.01007
(0.02261)
0.00242
(0.22958)
0.36004*
(0.20801)
0.04755
(0.07864)
ΔOpti,m-1 
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.03222
(0.06412)
0.03389
(0.02914)
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.06661
(0.17993)
0.19123**
(0.09563)
ΔForwci,m,
-0.16980
(0.14132)
0.02776
(0.05847)
-0.0916
(0.07385)
-0.12250
(0.14031)
0.02167
(0.05998)
-0.10359
(0.07641)
ΔForwci,m,-1 
Inserted as 
instrument
0.16635***
(0.05724)
0.19297
(0.11898)
Inserted as 
instrument
0.16380***
(0.05927)
0.18789
(0.11854)
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ΔFutci,m 
-0.01121
(0.02769)
0.00678
(0.04618)
0.01709
(0.02733)
-0.01724
(0.03923)
0.01897
(0.04996)
0.00411
(0.02972)
ΔFutci,m-1 
0.03463
(0.02728)
0.08212
(0.09835)
Inserted as 
instrument
0.03452
(0.03109)
0.10891
(0.10296)
0.60697
(0.47044)
ΔSwapi,m 
0.15927
(0.21290)
-0.00827
(0.52539)
-0.03198
(0.41378)
0.65132**
(0.28279)
1.33167*
(0.76224)
0.27143
(0.30489)
ΔSwapi,m-1 
-0.15943
(0.31431)
0.13820
(0.83271)
Inserted as 
instrument
-0.73801
(0.48641)
-1.71483
(1.68078)
Inserted as 
instrument
ΔOpti,m 
-0.00027
(0.10740)
0.18039
(0.26570)
0.03842
(0.09046)
0.21563
(0.44508)
0.19130
(0.62709)
-0.03992
(0.17932)
ΔOpti,m-1 
inserted as 
instrument
0.16201
(0.21104)
Inserted as 
instrument
Inserted as 
instrument
0.24101
(0.81285)
Inserted as 
instrument
ΔForwci,m 
0.11177
(0.12331)
0.13654
(0.45794)
0.27761
(0.28428)
0.11035
(0.13871)
0.19214
(0.52957)
0.15533
(0.281698)
ΔForwci,m,-1 
-0.12203
(0.14882)
0.06154
(0.41874)
-0.14073
(0.23477)
-0.11835
(0.10751)
0.06450
(0.51325)
-0.04107
(0.24231)
Dlevergi
-0.63100**
(0.31895)
-4.27287
(6.46721)
-0.41374**
(0.16346)
-0.62311*
(0.35941)
-3.67785
(8.22668)
-0.48003***
(0.16373)
Table 7 considers the derivatives percentage in absolute and net terms as well as the total sample and its subsets 
(according to investors’ qualification level). Total sample: 18,259 monthly observations/ Qualified investors sample: 
5,560 monthly observations / Non-qualified investors sample: 12,699 monthly observations.
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients. ***Significant at the 1% level/**Significant at the 
5% level/*Significant at the 10% level. 
Source: Elaborated by authors.
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Table 8 
Relation between the net flow and the variation of derivatives in absolute and net terms
Panel A: Derivatives  
in Absolute Terms
Panel B: Derivatives  
in Net Terms
Models Type of Derivative
Total Qualified Non-qualified Total Qualified Non-qualified
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
M-7: 
Variation of 
the Net worth 
(Net Flow)
ΔDerivi,m 
-0.00014
(0.00019)
-0.00012
(0.00023)
0.00049
(0.00077)
-0.00028
(0.00029)
-0.00021
(0.00054)
0.00112
(0.00155)
ΔDerivi,m-1 
-0.00020
(0.00016)
-0.00022
(0.00018)
-0.00075
(0.00058)
-0.00047*
(0.00026)
-0.00082**
(0.00037)
0.00029
(0.00174)
Table 8 considers the derivatives percentage in absolute and net terms as well as the total sample and its subsets 
(according to investors’ qualification level).
Total sample: 18,259 monthly observations/ Qualified investors sample: 5,560 monthly observations / Non-qualified 
investors sample: 12,699 monthly observations.
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients.
***Significant at the 1% level/**Significant at the 5% level/*Significant at the 10% level.
ΔDerivi,m-1(absolute)= ΔFutci,m (absolute) + ΔForwci,m (absolute)+ ΔOpti,m (absolute)+ ΔSwapi,m (absolute)
ΔDerivi,m-1,y(net)= ΔFutci,m (net) + ΔForwci,m (net)+ ΔOpti,m (net)+ ΔSwapi,m (net)
Source: Elaborated by authors.
As performance and management fees are calculated on the fund’s net worth, according to 
Kouwenberg and Ziemba (2007), greater increments in this amount are associated with higher 
intrinsic benefits received by managers. Thus, referring to the fund’s net flow variation (Flowi,m,y), 
Model 7 ( Table 9) shows a significant but negative association between it and swaps and options 
usage (in net and absolute terms) for the total and non-qualified samples. The same relation is 
observed for the leverage dummy (Dlevergi). In principle, this could imply that the investors 
reacted to the strategy adopted by managers withdrawing their money from funds that take 
riskier positions in derivatives.
Since the variable Flowi,m,y is positively associated with the previous fund’s return and with the 
Ibrx-100m-1,y return (as one can see in Table 10), it is possible that the net flow reduction had 
directly impacted the retraction of the funds’ net worth, considering the total sample. 
Additionally, it is important to emphasize that the volume of outflows is significant for the 
non-qualified investors, in which it was observed a positive net flow only for the third quartile 
(as seen in Table 2, section 4.1). A possible aspect that could have contributed for these outflows 
is the fact that, as shown in Table 11, the majority of funds presented an inferior or at least a 
less superior return compared to those offered by investments correlated with the risk-free rate. 
Such alternatives of investment are expressed by, for instance, funds, public and private bonds, 
whose risk is in general lower than those performed by hedge funds.
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Table 9 
Relation between the net flow and the net worth percentage invested in derivatives
Panel A: Derivatives in Absolute Terms Panel B: Derivatives in Net Terms
Model Type of Derivative
Total Qualified Non-Qualified Total Qualified Non-Qualified
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
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ΔFutci,m 
0.00015
(0.00028)
-0.00034
(0.00022)
0.00021
(0.00035)
-0.00017
(0.00056)
-0.00134
(0.00085)
-0.00010
(0.00057)
ΔFutci,m-1, 
-0.00028
(0.00026)
-0.00023
(0.00033)
-0.00055**
(0.00027)
-0.00078
(0.00063)
-0.00129
(0.00087)
-0.00131*
(0.00068)
ΔSwapi,m 
-0.01101***
(0.00364)
-0.00596
(0.00586)
-0.01750***
(0.00423)
-0.010520**
(0.00424)
-0.00355
(0.00661)
-0.01718***
(0.0059)
ΔSwapi,m-1 
-0.00810***
(0.00239)
-0.00572
(0.00349)
-0.00917***
(0.00294)
-0.01123**
(0.00358)
-0.00515
(0.00471)
-0.01328 ***
(0.00434)
ΔOpti,m 
-0.00153**
(0.00062)
-0.00134
(0.00121)
-0.00154**
(0.00062)
-0.00365***
(0.00118)
-0.00319*
(0.00170)
-0.00408***
(0.00151)
ΔOpti,m-1 
0.00015
(0.00066)
-0.00087
(0.00077)
0.00094
(0.00076)
-0.00110
(0.00114)
-0.00269**
(0.00116)
0.00120
(0.00154)
ΔForwci,m 
0.00093
(0.00063)
0.00229**
(0.00110)
6.334E-05
(0.00078)
0.00112*
(0.00063)
0.00260**
(0.00115)
0.00031
(0.00077)
ΔForwci,m,-1 
0.00069
(0.00056)
0.00152
(0.00100)
8.557E-05
(0.00070)
0.00075
(0.00056)
0.00194*
(0.00104)
0.00040
(0.00070)
Dlevergi
-0.01163***
(0.00214)
-0.00969***
(0.00311)
-0.01367***
(0.00273)
-0.01124***
(0.00214)
-0.010148
(0.00309)
-0.01340 
(0.00277)
Table 9 considers the derivatives percentage in absolute and net terms as well as the total sample and its subsets 
(according to investors’ qualification level). Total sample: 18,259 monthly observations/ Qualified investors sample: 
5,560 monthly observations / Non-qualified investors sample: 12,699 monthly observations.
Values in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients. ***Significant at the 1% level/**Significant at the 
5% level/*Significant at the 10% level.
Source: Elaborated by authors.
Table 11 shows that, for the 1st quartile, the median and the mean of the monthly return of 
risk-free rate are not superior to 0.5% per month in the majority of the sample, having a negative 
value for the retail investors. Consequently, it is not possible to state that investors, particularly 
those less informed, react negatively to the use of opaque assets (derivatives), taking their resources 
out. In other words, it cannot be claimed that they could clearly foresee the impact of managers’ 
strategies on both the increase of the fund’s risk and the investors net wealth losses. It could 
be the case that the investors had just observed the fund’s return before withdrawing without 
evaluating the portfolios’ composition or even its associated risks. This empirical evidence is 
supported by Chen (2011, p.1) who state that investors do not differentiate derivatives users 
when making investment decisions, and by Ivković and Weisbenner (2009, p.4) who claim that, 
in the context of mutual funds, outflows are related only to funds’ one-year “absolute” returns. 
Also, Grecco (2013, p. 108) observe a “herd outflow behavior” by retail investors of equity funds 
in the Brazilian market, especially when the performance of the stock market is negative.
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Table 10 
Model 7 (variation of the fund’s net flow)
Variable
Total Investors Qualified Investors Non-qualified investors
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Flowi,m-1
0.153564*
(0.02174)
0.081591**
(0.02465)
0.183410*
(0.02465)
Flowi,m-2
0.066309*
(0.01703)
0.074743*
(0.02031)
0.067084*
(0.02031)
r2i,m-1
0.244817*
(0.05088)
0.178732*
(0.06378)
0.289040*
(0.06563)
r2i,m-2
0.292254*
(0.04187)
0.22401*
(0.05034)
0.339520*
(0.05783)
Dlevergi
-0.011636*
(0.00211)
-0.009691*
(0.00311)
-0.013678*
(0.00273)
Dlevergi x Dloseri,m-1 - -
-0.009653*
(0.00327)
Ibrx-100m-1
0.032626**
(0.01609)
0.045610***
(0.02773) -
ΔFutci,m (absolute)
0.000157
(0.00029)
-0.000348
(0.00022)
0.000212
(0.00035)
ΔFutci,m-1 (absolute)
-0.000285
(0.00027)
-0.00023
(0.00033)
-0.000551**
(0.00028)
ΔSwapi,m (absolute)
-0.011014*
(0.00364)
-0.00596
(0.00586)
-0.017502*
(0.00423)
ΔSwapi,m-1 (absolute)
-0.008102*
(0.00239)
-0.00572
(0.00349)
-0.009173*
(0.00294)
ΔOpti,m (absolute)
-0.001534*
(0.00062)
-0.00134
(0.00122)
-0.001550**
(0.00062)
ΔOpti,m-1 (absolute)
0.000159
(0.00066)
-0.00087
(0.00077)
0.000945
(0.00076)
ΔForwci,m (absolute)
0.000937
(0.00064)
0.00229**
(0.00110)
0.000622
(0.00423)
ΔForwci,m,-1 (absolute)
0.000696
(0.00057)
0.00152
(0.00100)
0.000080
(0.00070)
Dyear2014
-0.006476*
(0.00225) - -
Dyear2010 -
0.016669**
(0.00827) -
Test Statistic Test P-Value Statistic Test P-Value Statistic Test P-Value
Sargan’s Test 206.873 1.000 92.361 1.000 145.346 0.523
Test of 1st Autocorrelation 
Order -10.007 0.000 -5.225 0.000 -8.881 0.000
Test of 2st Autocorrelation 
Order -1.243 0.214 -1.589 0.112 -0.825 0.409
* Significant at the 1% level/**Significant at the 5% level/***Significant at the 10% level. Values in parentheses are 
the standard errors of the coefficients.
Instruments applied to the qualified investor sample equation: Flowi,m-3.
Instruments applied to the non-qualified investor sample equation: Dyear2014, Flowi,m-3.
Instruments applied to the total sample equation: Flowi,m-3 and Dcat2i. 
Source: Elaborated by authors.
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5. CONCLUSION
Using a sample covering 352 Brazilian hedge funds in the period from January 2010 to 
December 2015, we verified if opacity (measured by derivatives usage) creates value for investors 
and managers of hedge funds (that charge performance fee). In sum, we find that more investments 
in opaque assets are associated with higher portfolios’ risk, but not with higher adjusted return 
to investors. Nevertheless, we also checked the relation between opaque assets and their  benefits 
received by managers. Sato (2014, p.3) states that managers can inflate the expected funds’ 
returns through leveraged operations raising their investments in opaque assets, in order to raise 
investors’ expectations and consequently increase funds’ inflows. When investors allocate their 
money in these investment funds, the amount of fees (such as those related to management and 
performance fees, which are based on the fund’s net worth) goes up and leads to higher revenues 
to the managers. As shown by M-7 (Table 8 and 9) we do not find a significant and positive 
relation between derivatives and the fund’s net flows. 
However, due to the negative relationship found between opaque assets (derivatives) and 
investors’ adjusted return, some protective policies are required, particularly those directed to 
hedge fund retail investors. These investors cannot clearly understand the risks associated with 
the strategies implemented by managers or even employ sophisticated performance analyses that 
incorporate the shares’ volatility in their calculation, as stated by Jones, Lee and Yeager (2013). 
Our evidence is supported by the discussion in Ongena and Zalewska (2017) with regard to 
pension funds, since: i) the level of financial education of the general population remains low and 
there are no signs that it will rise over the time (Ongena and Zalewska, 2017, p.9); ii) individual 
investors always have limited access to information (Ongena and Zalewska, 2017, p.13); and 
iii) pension fund managers have their own objectives, which can direct the fund towards better 
short-term performance, to the detriment of higher long-term returns that tend to be preferred 
by investors (Ongena and Zalewska, 2017, p.14 ).
Therefore, a first suggestion to mitigate this problem would be to limit  access of this segment 
to hedge funds by raising the minimum amount required as initial investment or requiring a 
minimum level of qualification. Furthermore, as suggested by Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro (2008) 
and Dybving, Farnsworth and Carpenter (2010), the contract that regulates the management 
of third parties resources should clearly specify not only the fees charged but also all the allowed 
investment operations and their risk. 
Table 11 
Basic Statics for the fund’s monthly premium * 
Investors’ qualification level
Statistics Professional Qualified Non-qualified
Minimum -37.680% -29.550% -10.900%
1st Quartile -0.417% -0.356% -0.429%
Median 0.126% 0.030% -0.015%
Mean 0.219% 0.008% -0.033%
3rd Quartile 0.783% 0.337% 0.394%
Maximum 38.730% 29.850% 12.190%
* The monthly premium is calculated as the difference between the fund’s return and the Cdi-Over return. 
Source: Elaborated by authors.
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Additional regulatory issues should be considered regarding the protection of small retail 
investors, such as the establishment of restrictions on  fund managers’ decisions concerning 
investments made in derivative markets, even in leveraged funds. We expect our empirical 
findings would contribute to debates on the introduction of more protective policies that favor 
these investors.
For future research, we also suggest  further exploring the evaluation of the impact of derivatives 
on outflows, inflows and net inflows separately since we only employed the net flow measure 
in our analysis.
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Endnotes
1 The “Strategy” classification includes funds whose operations follow the strategies selected by managers. 
All of them are allowed to adopt leverage strategies. The “Allocation” classification encompasses funds 
directed to long-term return. Some of them can engage in leverage operations. The “Investment abroad” 
classification considers funds that invest more than 40% of their net worth in assets negotiated abroad. 
All of them are allowed to conduct leverage operations.
2 [Exchange rate on January 4th, 2016.]
3 The description of the instruments employed in each equation can be required to the authors.
